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RETHINKING HOW VOTERS CHALLENGE
GERRYMANDERING: CONGRESS, COURTS, AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS
Megan Wilson*
“Constitutions are not ephemeral documents, designed to meet
passing occasions. The future is their care, and therefore, in their
application, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of
what may be.”
– Justice William Brennan1

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2016, President Trump won the electoral college but lost the
popular vote by almost 2.9 million votes.2 Unsurprisingly, the election
sparked a heated debate about the effectiveness of our voting system
and the role of the electoral college.3 What has been surprising is the
public’s increased interest in the effect gerrymandering has on
elections.4
Arguably, voting rights received the highest level of attention
from the public and legal scholars during the 1960s civil rights
* J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Psychology, Loyola
Marymount University, Los Angeles. I would like to thank my parents, Peter Wilson and Glenda
Sanders, for all their guidance, support, and last-minute edits. Special thanks to Professor Justin
Levitt for his willingness to debate with me and helping shape this paper, as well as Ariana
Rodriguez for being a tireless editor and friend. Finally, I would like to thank Loyola Law Review
members for all their help during the writing and editing process.
1. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1977).
2. Gregory Krieg, It’s Official: Clinton Swamps Trump in Popular Vote, CNN
(Dec. 22, 2016, 5:34 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/21/politics/donald-trump-hillaryclinton-popular-vote-final-count/index.html.
3. See, e.g., Alvin Chang, Trump Will Be the 4th President to Win the Electoral College After
Getting Fewer Votes than His Opponent, VOX (Dec. 16, 2016, 1:37 PM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/11/9/13572112/trump-popular-vote-loss.
4. G. Terry Madonna & Michael Young, Guest Column: How Gerrymandering is Damaging
Our Political Process, DAILY TIMES (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.delcotimes.com/opinion/guestcolumn-how-gerrymandering-is-damaging-our-political-process/article_a36acbe4-3c36-52e2be4c-51d539a753f4.html (noting that public interest in gerrymandering often “waxes and wanes”
in accordance with the decennial census).
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movement.5 The Warren Court would make a number of decisions that
extended voting rights protections, in what would come to be known
as the reapportionment revolutions.6 However, public interest in
protecting voting rights would wane until the mid to late 80s, when
Congress passed the Voting Rights Act.7 Again, this interest would
not last, and by the 90s growing numbers of white voters viewed the
protections afforded by the Voting Rights Act as unfairly giving
minority groups political advantages over white voters.8
In contrast, the current interest in voting rights shows an increased
concern with gerrymandering’s ability to undermine elections.9 With
that concern has come a push by the public for something to be done.
Possibly as a response to this public concern, the Supreme Court has
taken on two partisan gerrymandering cases this term.10 Despite the
public and legal community’s renewed interest in gerrymandering
claims, little attention has been given to state court voting rights
decisions.11
This Note will argue that the attention devoted to voting rights
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment is misplaced because
“state courts are the primary actors in shaping the right to vote” and
protecting the integrity of the election process.12 Part II of this Note
will provide a basic background on gerrymandering and the United
States political system. Part III will give an overview of federal
redistricting jurisprudence to show how the Supreme Court has limited
possible voting rights violations under the Fourteenth Amendment to
only cases where the plaintiff has been denied a chance to influence
the political process as a whole, which may be an impossible standard.
Part IV explains how Congressional non-involvement and federal
jurisprudence has led to unchecked gerrymandering. As a result,

5. RICHARD K. SCHER ET AL., VOTING RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY, ix–x (1997).
6. Id.
7. Id. at x.
8. Id. at xi–xii.
9. Madonna & Young, supra note 4.
10. See Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Will Take Up a Second Gerrymandering Case This
Term, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/2017/12
/08/4fde65f4-dc66-11e7-b1a8-62589434a581_story.html.
11. Joshua A. Douglas, State Judges and the Right to Vote, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 2 (2016) (noting
that studies show media coverage of state courts is disproportionately low given the importance of
their decisions).
12. Id.
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gerrymandering has increased, undermining the Framers’ intent to
create a representative government, and suppresses elections.
Finally, Part V will argue that state courts are better situated than
federal courts to protect the right to vote. Drawing on the cases
discussed in Part II, this Part will explain how federal courts are
limited by the United States Constitution’s lack of expressed
protection for voting rights. In contrast, the constitutions of forty-nine
states contain language directly protecting the right to vote.
Furthermore, the Note will argue that state courts have historically
been the protector of individual rights and should, therefore, interpret
their own constitutional protections as stronger than those of the
United States Constitution.
II. OVERVIEW OF GERRYMANDERING AND THE UNITED STATES
ELECTORAL SYSTEM
By the time the Constitutional Convention was held in 1787, the
Founding Fathers had already decided that America’s national
elections would use a representative system, rather than a direct
democracy.13 The process of electing representatives to the Senate and
House of Representatives established two approaches to
representation.14 The Senate would be made of two members from
every state and thus, representation would be based on state interests,
regardless of each state’s population.15 The number of members in the
House would be decided based on population, with each House
member originally representing 30,000 people, a number that would
increase over time.16
Because population growth in the United States is never stable,
redistricting and reapportionment are necessary to ensure that each
district is comprised of the correct number of voters.17 State and local
governments use the House model of representation and also require
regular redistricting.18 Issues arise and courts are called on to intervene
when people believe that the methods or manner of redistricting are
unfair and undermine the political process. One such problematic
method of redistricting is gerrymandering, or political redistricting,
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

SCHER ET AL., supra note 5, at 1–2.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
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which is the “deliberate effort[] to draw district lines for political
advantage.”19
State legislatures use three common gerrymandering techniques
to redistrict to their advantage: packing, shacking, and cracking.20
These techniques help a party create a map that ensures it will win the
most seats possible and waste the opposing party’s votes.21 Cracking
is the process of breaking up large groups of opposing party voters and
placing them in districts that heavily support the controlling party.22
However, in areas where the vote is competitive, a party will instead
redistrict by packing as many opposing party voters into as few
districts as possible.23 While packing requires giving up some seats, it
ensures a win in most of the districts.24 Finally, shacking is used to
challenge the success of an opposing party’s incumbent
representative.25 This can be done by moving an incumbent’s
residence to a new district, preventing her from relying on the
constituents who previously elected her.26 Alternatively, two
incumbents from the opposing party can be placed in the same district,
which forces them to compete for a single seat.27
Although the power to oversee the logistics of federal elections
has been granted to Congress by the United States Constitution,28
Congress has rarely provided any instructions on how to appropriately

19. Id. at 19. The term gerrymandering is derived from the combination of the words Gerry
and salamander. In response to efforts by Massachusetts governor, Elbridge Gerry, to redraw
districts to favor his party, a cartoon was published depicting a district shaped like a salamander,
including an embellished forked tongue, wings, and talons. Id. at 19–20.
20. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review
of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 551–52 (2004).
21. Id. at 551.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 551–552.
24. Id. at 552.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall
have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5
(“Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own
Members . . . .”).
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draw district lines.29 One consequence has been vote dilution, meaning
a person’s vote can have different weight depending on where the
voter lives.30 For example, the number of House representatives from
each state was originally determined by population and every House
representative was elected by districts with about the same
population.31 Over time, the number of members in the House grew in
response to population growth.32 However, in response to the 1910
Census, Congress capped the number of House representatives at
435.33 Because the United States population was growing but new
House seats were not being added, voter dilution happened in two
significant ways.34
First, representatives in states with smaller population growth
could be elected with a smaller number of votes than representatives
in states with larger population growth because new representatives
were not being added to account for population differences.35 Second,
within states, the population in urban areas grew much more rapidly
than in rural areas.36 In some states the difference in populations
between districts could be as high as three to one.37 The effect was an
over representation of rural, usually white, voters because House
members elected from those districts represented far fewer people than
those elected by urban voters.38
Modern voter dilution, caused by state legislatures’
gerrymandering, can be traced back to judicial non-involvement.
Because Congress has not exercised much control over state
redistricting, court decisions have signaled to state legislatures how
aggressively they can gerrymander.39 For example, in 2004, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer,40 although only a
plurality, “sent a clear signal that a majority of the Court was not
29. ANTHONY J. MCGANN ET AL., GERRYMANDERING IN AMERICA: THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE FUTURE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 24
(2016).
30. See id. at 23.
31. SCHER ET AL., supra note 5, at 2.
32. MCGANN ET AL., supra note 29, at 25.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 26.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 185.
40. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
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inclined to overturn districting plans on grounds of partisan
gerrymandering.”41 Given the impact judicial decisions have on a
legislature’s ability to gerrymander, Part III will give an overview of
the development of federal jurisprudence on redistricting.
III. ANSWERING THE QUESTION OF JUSTICIABILITY AND THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT’S STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO
REDISTRICTING CLAIMS
Federal court decisions, compared with state court decisions,
receive a majority of the attention from legal scholars and the media.42
There are practical reasons for this. When the Supreme Court
interprets federal law, the opinion will apply nationwide.43 Even
decisions made in lower federal courts generally have a larger
geographic reach than state courts.44 Thus, federal courts may be seen
as the ideal place to challenge gerrymandering because of the impact
the decisions have. But, as described below, federal jurisprudence on
gerrymandering has evolved to make federal courts a less desirable
forum.
Section A gives examples of early redistricting cases and judicial
response. It will introduce the concepts of justiciability and Fourteenth
Amendment protections against vote dilution. Section B shows two
kinds of claims that the Court has found to be justiciable: racial
discrimination and unequal populations. Next, Section C highlights
the difficulty the Court has had in applying the Fourteenth
Amendment to purely political redistricting cases. Finally, Section D
gives an overview of one of the most recent gerrymandering cases to
come before the Supreme Court, but suggests even if the Court holds
that the claims are justiciable, the protections offered may be
insufficient to stop gerrymandering.
A. The Court’s Early Response to Gerrymandering
Because Congress has generally been uninvolved in regulating
the redistricting process, court decisions, particularly those by federal
courts, have become the ultimate authority. Thus, until the 1960s,
when courts first held the judiciary could intervene in redistricting
41.
42.
43.
44.

MCGANN ET AL., supra note 29, at 2.
Douglas, supra note 11, at 2.
Id.
Id.
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matters, state governments were relatively unrestrained in how they
redistricted.45 While cases decided before 1960 would be unsuccessful
at challenging redistricting, the issues discussed in these early cases
would become the foundation of the modern debate about judicial
intervention in redistricting.
In Wood v. Broom,46 the Court held that the Apportionment Act
of 1911’s equal, contiguous, and compact requirements were
applicable only to the 1910 apportionment cycle and thus, did not
apply to redistricting after the Apportionment Act of 1929.47 More
importantly, the Court acknowledged the potential for justiciability
being an issue in redistricting cases.48 However, the Court ended the
opinion by stating “[u]pon these questions the Court expresses no
opinion.”49
Next, in 1946, based on the holding in Wood, the Court in
Colegrove v. Green50 again rejected a claim based on the equal,
contiguous, and compact requirements of the 1911 Act.51 Petitioners
claimed that because Illinois’s legislature had failed to redistrict since
1901, the state’s districts violated the Apportionment Act of 1911 and
their right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.52
However, in his opinion, Justice Frankfurter chose to frame the issue
as a question of whether the Court could redraw Illinois’s map to
comply with 1911 Act.53 The opinion stated, “Courts ought not to
enter this political thicket. The remedy for unfairness in districting is
to secure State legislatures that will apportion properly, or to invoke
the ample powers of Congress.”54
Colegrove was decided by a 4-3 plurality, with Justice Rutledge
concurring only with the result. He instead argued that such claims
could be justiciable but “only in the most compelling
circumstances.”55

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

MCGANN ET AL., supra note 29, at 185.
287 U.S. 1 (1932).
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
328 U.S. 549 (1946).
Id. at 551.
Id. at 550.
Id. at 551–52.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 565 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
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In contrast, Justice Black, supported by two Justices, argued in
the dissent that the Court could rule on this claim because the
redistricting violated the Fourteenth Amendment.56 He reasoned that
there is no difference between a state legislature denying a person the
right to vote and “destroy[ing] the effectiveness of their vote.”57 In
either situation, “the admitted result is that the Constitutional policy
of equality of representation has been defeated.”58 He also dismissed
concerns that redistricting is a political question because it concerns
politics.59 Citing various cases,60 Justice Black showed that courts
have and should step in to protect individual rights, including the right
to vote.61
The Colegrove opinion raised two important questions about the
federal courts’ involvement in overseeing redistricting. First, if voters
and Congress have the power to stop legislatures from improperly
redistricting, should the courts intervene? Second, in what
circumstances could the Fourteenth Amendment be used to challenge
redistricting?
B. Compelling Circumstances as the Basis for the Equal Protection
Clause Voting Rights Jurisprudence
While the immediate result of the Colegrove decision was judicial
noninvolvement, Justice Rutledge’s “compelling circumstances”
doctrine would become the basis for one of the first successful
redistricting challenges.62
In 1960, Gomillion v. Lightfoot63 established a common
“compelling circumstance” for judicial intervention: racial
56. Id. at 570 (Black, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 571.
58. See id. at 572.
59. Id. at 573.
60. Compare Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 539 (1927) (rejecting the argument that a claim
raises a political question if the subject of the suit is political as “little more than a play upon words”
and holding claims based on evasions of political rights are justiciable), and Smiley v. Holm, 285
U.S. 355, 369–70 (1932) (holding that courts could rule on constitutionality of laws that “govern[]
the exercise of political rights”), with Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903) (declining to enforce
political rights because relief sought by plaintiffs, judicial supervision to ensure specific
performance of state electoral legislation, was not judicially manageable), and Coleman v. Miller,
307 U.S. 433, 454 (1939) (holding that claims challenging the ratification process of a
Constitutional amendment involved a political question because Congress, not the courts, has final
authority).
61. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 572–73.
62. MCGANN ET AL., supra note 29, at 29.
63. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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discrimination. There, plaintiffs claimed that the boundaries of the
City of Tuskegee, Alabama, had been redrawn to exclude the majority
black communities.64 They argued this denied them the right to vote
in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment and the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.65 The Court
held that “[w]hen a legislature thus singles out a readily isolated
segment of a racial minority for special discriminatory treatment, it
violates the Fifteenth Amendment.”66 The majority opinion did not
address plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim.
In contrast, Justice Whittaker’s concurring opinion argued that
plaintiffs’ equal right to vote had not been violated because they were
not treated differently than other voters in their new district.67
However, he did believe that defendant’s actions had unlawfully
segregated voters based on race in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.68
Although both Colegrove and Gomillion sought to challenge
voter dilution, the Court expressly distinguished Gomillion from
Colegrove.69 The Court reasoned that in Gomillion “affirmative
legislative action [had] deprive[d] [the plaintiffs] of their votes and the
consequent advantages that the ballot affords” because of their race.70
The racial discrimination “lift[ed] this controversy out of the so-called
‘political’ arena and into the conventional sphere of constitutional
litigation.”71 However, the Court also used an almost identical
argument to the one made by Justice Black in his Colegrove dissent to
hold that a statute is not immune from constitutional challenges simply
because it involves a political mechanism.72 In fact, although Justice
Douglas joined the majority opinion, he noted that he “adheres to the
dissents in Colegrove v. Green,” suggesting he does not believe racial
classifications were necessary for judicial involvement.73
Gomillion established that, in some circumstances, courts could
hear claims that a state’s redistricting plan was unconstitutional. Thus,
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 340.
Id.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 349 (Whittaker, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 346 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 346–47.
See id. at 347.
See id. at 348 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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this case created one of the first constraints on redistricting—a statute
could not discriminate against a racial group.
In 1962, in Baker v. Carr,74 the Court would again expand on the
limits of redistricting. Plaintiffs alleged the Tennessee legislature had
failed to enact a new redistricting statute since 1901 and, as result of
population growth, votes in some counties were apportioned more
weight than others.75 Thus, plaintiffs claimed their votes had been
debased in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.76 Although the
Court did not rule on the merits of the case, it established that an Equal
Protection claim based on unequal populations within districts could
succeed.77
In determining if the case involved a political question, the Court
reiterated that a discrimination claim based on Equal Protection does
not become non-justiciable merely because it involves a political
right.78 Instead a claim is a political question when there is “a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it.”79
Baker and similar, subsequent cases based on population inequity
ultimately established the “one person, one vote” rule, which requires
reasonably equal populations in each district.80
C. Modern Jurisprudence: Into the Political Thicket
A comparison of the holdings in Colegrove and Baker shows the
shift in the Court’s treatment of redistricting claims. The Court no
longer believed that all redistricting claims were non-justiciable, and

74. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
75. Id. at 191–92. “We are told that single vote in Moore County, Tennessee is worth 19 votes
in Hamilton County . . . .” Id. at 245 (Douglas, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 193–94 (majority opinion).
77. See id. at 237.
78. Id. at 209–10.
79. See id. at 217. As shown below, these two factors have proven to be the most used in
subsequent cases. However, the Court identifies six factors in total: “[A] textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.” Id.
80. MCGANN ET AL., supra note 29, at 32–33.

(8)52.1_WILSON (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

10/30/2019 9:51 PM

HOW VOTERS CHALLENGE GERRYMANDERING

73

the dissent in Colegrove would prove to predict this change. The Court
now agreed that a district map could be invalidated based on race and
unequal population.81 Moreover, the Court expressed the belief that
the Fourteenth Amendment standard could be used to evaluate
gerrymandering claims.82 However, the Court’s consensus would end
there. The two cases discussed below show how the Court has had a
more difficult time deciding just what the Equal Protection standard
requires.
In 1986, Davis v. Bandemer83 attempted to establish a standard of
review that would be used to evaluate whether partisan
gerrymandering violated the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiffs were
Democrats in Indiana who alleged that the Republican controlled state
legislature intentionally redistricted for the purpose of disadvantaging
Democrats.84 The results of the 1982 election showed Democrats did
not gain seats proportional to the number of votes received.85 For
example, in the House elections, Democratic candidates won 51.9%
of the votes, but received only forty-three of the one-hundred seats.86
The Court addressed whether Plaintiffs’ claim was justiciable and, if
so, what standard should applied to determine whether an equal
protection violation occurred.87 The result was a widely divided
opinion.
A majority of the Court, 6-3, held that a partisan gerrymandering
claim could be justiciable.88 In contrast, the three dissenting Justices
asserted that the claim involved a political question, because there was
no judicially manageable standard under which the Court could
analyze it.89 In addition, although the majority agreed that there is a
standard to evaluate these Equal Protection claims, they disagreed on
what standard courts should apply.
A plurality of four Justices advocated for a test that would require
plaintiffs to show both intent to discriminate against a group and an
actual discriminatory effect.90 To prove discriminatory effect,
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Baker, 369 U.S. at 237; Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346 (1960).
Baker, 369 U.S. at 237.
478 U.S. 109 (1986).
Id. at 115.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 127.
Id. at 148 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 127 (majority opinion).
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plaintiffs must show they were consistently denied equal access to the
political process as a whole.91 A lack of proportional representation,
especially in a single election cycle, would be insufficient to show
effect because the power to influence the election goes beyond the
particular result.92 A losing group is presumed to be adequately
represented by the winning candidate.93 The holding created an odd
standard94 under which a court can find intentional discrimination but
no effect, if a party cannot sufficiently show redistricting biased
several elections’ results and impacted statewide political power.95
In 2004, Vieth v. Jubelirer called into question the holding of
Bandemer.96 The majority opinion, supported by a 5-4 vote, affirmed
the district court’s decision to dismiss the case, but only four Justices
agreed it should be dismissed as a non-justiciable issue.97 Justice
Scalia, writing for those four Justices, argued there was no
discoverable and manageable standard under which the Court could
evaluate the claim.98 Justice Scalia noted that in the eighteen years
since Bandemer, courts have almost unanimously refused to intervene
in gerrymandering cases, because the Bandemer standard cannot be
met and no new, better standard has been proposed.99 However,
Justice Kennedy, the other majority vote, stated in a concurring
opinion that a judicially manageable standard could exist, but that it
had not yet been articulated.100 Additionally, three of the four
dissenting Justices each advocated for a different standard in separate
dissenting opinions.101
Thus, while Vieth did not overturn Bandemer or establish that
partisan gerrymandering was a non-justiciable issue, it did show the
Court struggled to reach a consensus about the Court’s role in
gerrymandering claims. Under the Bandemer standard,
91. Id. at 132.
92. Id. at 131–32.
93. Id. at 132.
94. In the context of other Fourteenth Amendment claims, the courts often note: “the law
recognizes that a government that sets out to discriminate intentionally in its enforcement of some
neutral law or policy will rarely if ever fail to achieve its purpose.” Doe v. Vill. of Mamaroneck,
462 F. Supp. 2d 520, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
95. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 130–31.
96. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 281.
99. Id. at 281–82.
100. Id. at 311.
101. Id. at 317.
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gerrymandering must impact the ability to participate in the electoral
process as whole, limiting the court’s involvement to only claims of
gross, widespread gerrymandering.102 A limitation that the majority in
Vieth believed would be impossible to satisfy.103 Although the Equal
Protection Clause may prove to be a discoverable and manageable
standard for some redistricting claims, it appears less helpful in
evaluating purely political claims.
D. Precedents Collide in Gill v. Whitford: Supreme Court
Showdown Between Bandemer and Vieth
In 2017, the Supreme Court agreed to hear Gill v. Whitford.104
Plaintiffs argued they had found a judicially discoverable and
manageable standard: a three-part burden-shifting test based on the
test articulated in Bandemer.105 First, a plaintiff would have to show
an intent by defendants to gerrymander for partisan advantage.106
Second, she would need to prove actual partisan effect.107 If the
plaintiff is able to meet her burden, the statute is presumed
unconstitutional.108 The third element would shift the burden to
defendants to justify the district make-up based on legitimate state
policy or the state’s political geography.109 If the defendant is unable
to rebut the presumption, the court would rule the map
unconstitutional, invalidating its use in further elections and requiring
the state to draw a new map.110
In this case, Plaintiffs claimed that the election results from 2012
and 2014 showed Democrats have been shut out of the electoral
process.111 In 2012, Republicans won 48.6% of the votes and sixty out
of ninety-nine seats, and in 2014, they won 52% of the votes and 63
seats.112 Plaintiffs contended Republicans achieved these results by
102. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 131–32 (1986).
103. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 287–89.
104. 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016); see Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017).
105. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 854.
106. Id. at 854–55.
107. Id. at 855.
108. Id.
109. Id. The district court made no finding as to which party should bear the burden of proving
this element, but found that if the plaintiff had the burden, they had met it. Id. at 911.
110. Id. at 855.
111. Id. at 853; see Mark Joseph Stern, Is Partisan Gerrymandering Dead?, SLATE
(Oct. 3, 2017, 4:12 PM) https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/10/will-gill-v-whitford-killpartisan-gerrymandering.html.
112. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 853.
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cracking and packing Democrats to waste or dilute their votes, and that
the newly developed efficiency gap theory is evidence of these
practices’ effect on the elections.113
Again, the Court was asked to decide whether the Fourteenth
Amendment provides a sufficiently discoverable and manageable
standard to make gerrymandering claims justiciable. However, as the
cases have shown, the question of justiciability has created
increasingly divided opinions. Not only is there debate over the
appropriate standard, but also what a lack of standard means for the
justiciability of the claim.114 Moreover, a decision endorsing
justiciability would only allow court intervention in the most extreme
cases of gerrymandering. However, any redistricting to disadvantage
voters should raise serious concerns about the impact it has on voting
rights.
IV. HOW UNCHECKED GERRYMANDERING UNDERMINES
REPRESENTATION AND SUPPRESSES ELECTIONS
Every election cycle, voters are inundated with political content
geared at convincing them of the urgency of their vote and the
competitiveness of elections. Yet “[t]he first instinct of power is the
retention of power”115 and state legislatures understand that power can
be retained “directly by the suppression of competitive elections
themselves.”116 In addition, the use of technology to draw districts and
collect information, an increased predictability in voter patterns, and

113. Id. at 854. The efficiency gap theory offers a simplified equation for determining the
percentage of votes wasted by each party in a given election. The equation starts with the
assumption that a winning party “wastes” any votes over the 50% mark because they are more than
a party needs to win. Who’s Gerry and Why Is He So Bad at Drawing Maps?, MORE PERFECT
(Oct. 2, 2017),
https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/whos-gerry-and-why-he-so-bad-drawingmaps/. In contrast, it assumes that any votes for the losing party in a given district are all “wasted”
because they did not help achieve a win. Id. In addition, the theory has a number of advantages.
First, the math can be simplified into a basic equation described above. Mira Bernstein & Moon
Duchin, A Formula Goes to Court: Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 64 NOTICES
AM. MATHEMATICAL SOC’Y 1020, 1024 (2017). Second, the efficiency gap can be calculated using
the results of a single election. Id.
114. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281–83, 309–11 (2004) (compare Justice Scalia,
finding that a lack of standard makes the claims non-justiciable, with Justice Kennedy, preferring
to hold off on ruling on justiciability in the hopes that a standard will be articulated).
115. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 263 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
116. Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118
HARV. L. REV. 28, 56 (2004).
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modern court cases have all allowed political parties to gerrymander
more effectively in order to secure and maintain their power.117
There are two ways state legislatures use gerrymandering to
suppress elections. First, partisan gerrymandering works by diluting
the strength of the opposing party’s votes.118 The party in power at the
time of redistricting draws the districts to better secure its control.119
The controlling party can ensure a favorable outcome, not only in the
coming election, but also in subsequent election cycles.120 Second,
bipartisan or “sweetheart” gerrymandering allows both parties to limit
the competitiveness of elections.121 Both parties agree to draw districts
to ensure their incumbents are placed in safe districts where voters will
reliably reelect the chosen candidate.122
A. Modern Gerrymandering Conflicts with the Framers’ Intent to
Protect the Power of the People
Both kinds of gerrymandering are an affront to the principles of
democratic representation. This is best understood when considering
the history and purpose of the House of Representatives. The twohouse structure of Congress represents The Great Compromise struck
between Federalists, who wanted Congress to derive its power directly
from the people, and Anti-Federalists, who argued Congress should be
chosen by state governments.123 Thus, the House was created based on
two founding principles.
First, the House was intended to represent the will of the people,
separate from the interests of the states.124 Thus, the number of House
representatives is based on population, rather than the geographical
boundaries of the state.125 Second, its election procedures were created
to ensure the House was sympathetic to and dependent on the concerns
of the people.126 House elections are held every two years, and, in a

117. Id.
118. See supra Part II.
119. Pildes, supra note 116, at 59.
120. Id. at 59–60. For example, the McGann Study claims the bias found by researchers will
persist until 2022, the first election after the next redistricting cycle. MCGANN ET AL., supra note
29, at 3.
121. Pildes, supra note 116, at 60–61.
122. Id.
123. MCGANN ET AL., supra note 29, at 179.
124. Id. at 181.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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functioning election system, members must respond to the changing
concerns of their constituents or be voted out of office.127
In contrast, when state legislatures are allowed to aggressively
gerrymander, the states, rather than the people, are given control over
House elections.128 Article 1, Section 4 of the United States
Constitution gives state legislatures the power to draw their own
congressional and state districts.129 But states are only required to
redistrict every ten years in response to the Census.130 As a result,
gerrymandering allows the party in control of the state legislature at
the time of redistricting to control the outcome of House elections for
the next decade.131 Thus, states are not only picking their House
representatives, but representatives also have little fear of removal,
leaving any accountability to the voters diminished or lost during those
ten years.132
The Framers of the Constitution anticipated this problem. James
Madison argued that if states have the sole power to draw districts they
would create districts that favored certain candidates for the state
legislature and “the inequality of the Representation in the
Legislatures of particular States [] would produce a like inequality in
their representation in the Nat[ional] Legislature, as it was presumable
that the Counties having the power in the former case would secure it
to themselves in the latter.”133 Thus, additional language was added to
Article 1, Section 4 that gives Congress the authority to “make or
alter” the districts created by states.134

127. See id. For example, a study done by Soroka and Wlezien found that a government that
has elections every two years is more responsive to rapid changes in public opinion than a
government that holds elections every four to five years. Id. at 192.
128. Id. at 190.
129. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress
may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations . . . .”).
130. SCHER ET AL., supra note 5, at 4.
131. See MCGANN ET AL., supra note 29, at 191. Potentially more concerning is the ability of
state legislatures to use gerrymandering to ensure outcomes in state elections. If a party can draw
state legislative districts to guarantee their party secures a majority in the state legislature, that same
party can gerrymander the House elections with little opposition. However, little research has been
done on modern levels of partisan gerrymandering of state electoral districts. Id. at 191. So, the
issue will not be discussed further in this Note.
132. Id. at 194–95.
133. Vieth v. Jubilerer, 541 U.S. 267, 275 (2004) (quoting 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 240–41 (M. Farrand ed. 1911)).
134. Id. at 275; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
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However, the increased partisan nature of our political system and
extensive integration of state and national parties has undermined the
Framers’ intentions.135 It is questionable whether Congress has ever
acted as a check on the states’ self-interested behavior,136 but now,
more than ever, Congress is incentivized to pressure state leaders to
aggressively gerrymander to secure party seats.137 Moreover, parties
may challenge specific state maps in an attempt to decrease the
opposing party’s power but both parties benefit from gerrymandering.
Thus, it is difficult to imagine Congressional representatives enacting
laws to challenge the system that elected them, despite any violations
it inflicts on constituents’ representational rights. In fact, “a
representative may feel more beholden to the cartographers who drew
her district than to the constituents who live there.”138
B. Federal Courts Are Reluctant to Combat Gerrymandering
Furthermore, the authority given to Congress by Article I, Section
4’s “make or alter”139 language has affected how the courts view
redistricting claims. First, courts have been concerned that
redistricting claims are not justiciable because Section 4 creates a
“constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department.”140 In Colegrove, the Court cites Section 4 as giving
Congress, not the courts, the power to ensure fair representation in the
House.141 Subsequent cases would find at least some individual claims
are justiciable, and limit the question of gerrymandering’s
135. Pildes, supra note 116, at 61.
136. Congress has exercised its authority to combat gerrymandering with decreasing frequency.
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 276; MCGANN ET AL., supra note 29, at 24. Between 1842 and 1911, Congress
enacted a series of Apportionment Acts that imposed requirements on redistricting such as
contiguity, compactness, and equal population. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 276; MCGANN ET AL., supra note
29. However, each new act superseded the previous and the only remaining requirement is states
must use single member districts. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 276. In 1965, Congress enacted the Voting
Rights Act, which has seen a success. Pildes, supra note 116, at 59. For example, beginning in the
early twentieth century, Southern Democrats used gerrymandering to “destroy [their] political
competitors . . . and thereby created a one-party monopoly that ruled the entire region” until the
passage of the act. Id. Since 1980, Congress has also introduced several bills, but none have passed.
See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 277.
137. Pildes, supra note 116, at 61.
138. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 470 (2006) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress
may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations . . . .”).
140. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 564 (1946).
141. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 554.
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justiciability to the existence of a manageable and discoverable
standard. But, the reasoning in Colegrove has twisted through
opinions and dissents all the way to Vieth.142 While Vieth did not
concern Article 1, Section 4, Justice Scalia still began the plurality
opinion by laying out the basis and history of Section 4 as a remedy to
the issues created by gerrymandering.143
In addition, federal courts have historically been reluctant to
invalidate districts because they believe if “Congress failed in
exercising its powers . . . the remedy ultimately lies with the people”
to elect officials who will.144 The logic of this assumption goes hand
in hand with another common argument: constituents’ rights are not
violated by the use of politics in districting because “today’s minority
could be tomorrow’s majority” and so representatives are sensitive to
all constituents’ concerns.145 However, as discussed below, these
assumptions are being challenged by social science research.
Thus, the combination of congressional noninvolvement and
judicial reluctance to intervene has given state legislatures the green
light to begin foreordaining election results. Research on House
elections has shown a recent increase in partisan and sweetheart
gerrymandering. As a result, legislatures are increasingly incentivized
to undermine fair elections by effectively disenfranchising voters who
are unable to vote them out.
C. Research on State Legislatures’ Ability to Control Elections
In Gerrymandering in America, researchers Anthony McGann,
Charles Smith, Michael Latner, and Alex Keena lay out the
methodology and results of the study they conducted on partisan
gerrymandering after Vieth (“McGann Study”). The researchers
hypothesized that while Vieth did not make gerrymandering claims
non-justiciable, state legislatures would view the plurality opinion as
effectively removing the courts from the conversation.146 And in fact,
they found that redistricting done after Vieth created significant bias

142. Vieth v. Jubilerer, 541 U.S. 267, 275, 285 (2004).
143. See id. at 275.
144. See Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 554.
145. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 469–70 (2006); Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 131–32 (1986).
146. MCGANN ET AL., supra note 29, at 1.
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in the voting process that can only be attributed to states pushing for
partisan advantage more aggressively than ever before.147
The McGann Study compared the results of House elections from
2002 to 2012.148 The basis of the methodology is partisan symmetry,
which looks to see if all parties would gain the same number of seats
if they won a given percentage of the vote.149 For example, in an
unbiased system, both Party A and Party B would receive 60% of the
seats if they won 55% of votes in a given state. If Party A can win the
same number of seats as Party B with less votes, there is a bias.150 The
study looked at the presence and effect of bias on national elections,
as well as in individual state results.151
The results of the McGann Study show a sharp increase in bias
towards Republicans at the national level in the 2012 election.152 The
study found the asymmetrical bias was 9.38%, meaning Republicans
gained 9.38% more seats than Democrats would have gained for the
same percentage of votes.153 In contrast, the results of the 2002–2010
elections only had an asymmetry level of 3.4% in favor of
Republicans.154 The level of bias found in the 2002–2010 election “is
only 35% of the bias [] observe[d] in 2012.”155
The McGann Study also looked at the results of the House
elections in each state. The level of bias found at the state level is even
more problematic. Looking at the ten most biased states, their level of
asymmetry for 2012 fell between approximately 30% and 40%, in
favor of Republicans.156 This means that if Republicans received 52%
of the votes and won 70% of the seats, Democrats would only receive
30% to 40% of the seats for the same 52% of votes.157 In comparison,
in the 2002–2010 elections there were fewer states that had a proRepublican bias, and the level of bias was much lower, and there were
more states with a pro-Democrat bias.158
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 65–66.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 72.
Id.
Id. at 73.
Id.
Id. 81.

(8)52.1_WILSON (DO NOT DELETE)

82

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

10/30/2019 9:51 PM

[Vol. 52:63

Next, the researchers hypothesized that two additional factors
would need to be true to show the increase was due to political
motives.159 First, that bias would be found predominately in states
where a party had the motive and opportunity to redistrict to the
party’s advantage.160 The study found legislatures were only
motivated to engage in partisan districting in states that had
competitive elections.161 Also, a party had sufficient opportunity when
it controlled the state legislature and the governor was a member of
that party.162 Second, states redistricting in 2012 would create more
bias, even in states that were already biased.163 This could be shown
in two ways. One, states that already had Republican bias in 2010
would have significantly more bias in 2012.164 Two, the states that
were biased towards Democrats but became Republican in 2010
would have much higher levels of bias in 2012 as compared to
previous years.165
The McGann Study found that both of these assumptions to be
true. Fourteen of the eighteen states where the level of bias was
statistically significant were found to have legislatures with a motive
and an opportunity to engage in partisan gerrymandering.166 “Thus,
with only a few exceptions, the presence of partisan control of the
districting process and electoral competitiveness at the electoral level
seem to be both necessary and sufficient conditions for partisan
bias.”167 Next, the study showed that legislatures redistricted for
partisan advantage more aggressively after 2010. In many states that
already had a pro-Republican bias in 2002, the bias almost doubled
and accounted for a 2.8% increase in national bias.168 Also, the bias in
states that did not have a Republican bias in 2002, but became
Republican biased in 2012, accounted for 3.7% of the national
increase.169 In previous years, Republicans would be expected to
create bias in a similar amount to the Democrats, but instead the study
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 146–47.
Id.
Id. at 148–49.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 158.
Id.
Id. at 158–59.
Id. at 157.
Id.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 162.

(8)52.1_WILSON (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

10/30/2019 9:51 PM

HOW VOTERS CHALLENGE GERRYMANDERING

83

shows they increased the bias by a large margin.170 These results
support the McGann Study’s claims that Vieth is actually responsible
for the increase in redistricting bias, because the alternative variables
did not change significantly between 2002 and 2012.171 These results
raise a number of concerns about whether the House is properly
functioning as a representative form of government.
Moreover, a 2006 study by Alan Abramowitz, Brad Alexander,
and Mathew Gunning found that the 2002 and 2004 elections were the
least competitive general elections in United States history as a result
of bi-partisan gerrymandering.172 Generally, elections following
redistricting, such as the 2002 election, see the most turn-over, but
only four of almost four hundred House incumbents lost the general
election.173 Of the 381 incumbents that did win, only forty-three won
by less than a landslide, defined as a victory of more than 60%.174
Moreover, a “competitive election” is generally characterized as one
in which the winner receives less than 55% of the votes.175 In 2002,
less than 10% of House elections were competitive.176 As such, House
incumbents had a reelection rate of 99% in 2002.177 More alarming is
the fact that these results were fairly consistent until 2010 when states
were forced to redistrict.178
Furthermore, the lack of competitiveness cannot be attributed to
voter preference for incumbents. United States Senate and
gubernatorial elections are held on a statewide basis and therefore are
not susceptible to gerrymandering.179 These elections are held on the
same day as House elections and about half of the 2002 races were
170. Id. For example, in 2010, Republicans in North Carolina won enough seats to gain control
of the state legislature. Id. In 2002, when the Democrats controlled, the level of pro-Democrat bias
was about 10%. Id. If Republicans were not redistricting more aggressively after Vieth, the results
of the 2012 election should show a pro-Republican bias of about 10%. Id. Instead, the 10% proDemocrat bias was replaced by a 36.6% pro-Republican bias. Id.
171. Id. at 70.
172. Alan I. Abramowitz et al., Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition in
U.S. House Elections, 68 J. POL. 75, 75 (2006).
173. Pildes, supra note 116, at 62.
174. Id. at 62–63.
175. See id. at 63.
176. Id.
177. Jaime Fuller, There Are 405 House Races Where the Frontrunner Has a 90% Chance of
Winning, WASH. POST, May 29, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2014/05/29/there-are-only-30-house-races-this-year-where-the-election-hasnt-alreadybeen-decided/?utm_term=.b6af216efaf7.
178. Id.
179. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 20, at 573.
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competitive.180 The election results from California are often cited to
demonstrate the disparity.181 In 2002, every House incumbent from
California won by a landslide, meaning no challenger received over
40% of the votes.182 In contrast, just a year later California voters
“rebelled in mass against the political status quo” and held a special
election to oust the elected governor and replace him with Arnold
Schwarzenegger, who is generally considered politically
independent.183
Thus, when incumbents use sweetheart gerrymandering to create
safe seats, “even a significant shift in popular preference would have
little effect on who gets elected.”184 Unlike partisan gerrymandering,
sweetheart gerrymandering does not allow one party to win seats
disproportional to votes they receive. Instead, if 60% of voters register
as Democrats, the state legislature will district to ensure Democrats
win 60% of the seats.185 So, the standards proposed by both Justices
and plaintiffs to evaluate the constitutionality of redistricting laws
would fail to find non-competitive elections a violation of voters’
rights.
V. STATE COURTS AS THE NEW CHAMPIONS OF VOTING RIGHTS
Because the United States Constitution does not include an
express right to vote, federal courts have used the Fourteenth
Amendment to extend protections for voting rights to include forms of
vote dilution.186 In the context of partisan gerrymandering, federal
jurisprudence has limited these protections only to those cases where
the plaintiffs can show they have been denied a chance to influence
the political process as a whole.187 This standard does not include
incumbent protection or potentially less overt methods of
gerrymandering. This Part will argue that state courts are the better
positioned to protect the right to vote because they are not limited by
federal precedent and are free to interpret the scope of voting rights
contained in their own constitutions.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
E.g., id.
Id.
Id.
Pildes, supra note 116, at 64.
Id.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962).
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 123 (1986).
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A. Additional Protection of the Right to Vote from the Fourteenth
Amendment
The United States Constitution does not include any provisions
expressly identify voting as a fundamental right. Instead, the
Constitution discusses elections in several clauses, but these clauses
only dictate the process of voting.188 No clause specifically
enumerates the right to vote.189 In addition, the Fourteenth,
Seventeenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth
Amendments only convey “negative” rights, or prohibitions on
governmental actions.190 As a result, early federal courts doubted
whether the Constitution created a right to vote.191
Moreover, the early Supreme Court cases that described the right
to vote as fundamental do not cite any particular constitutional
provision in support of this conclusion.192 Instead, the Court based its
decision on the important role voting plays in the preservation of
democracy.193 For example, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,194 the Court stated:
“Though not regarded strictly as a natural right, but as a privilege
merely conceded by society, according to its will, under certain
conditions, nevertheless it is regarded as a fundamental political right,
because preservative of all rights.”195
Finally, in the 1960s, a series of decisions by the Warren Court
would establish the Equal Protection Clause as the constitutional basis
for challenging laws that treated votes unequally.196 Because the
United States Constitution does not include an express right to vote,
federal courts have used the Fourteenth Amendment to hold the right
188. See supra note 28 (quoting the text of U.S. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2, 4, 5).
189. Joshua Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89, 95
(2014).
190. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (stating the punishment for states who prohibit eligible
citizens from voting); U.S. CONST. amend. XV (the right to vote shall not be denied based on race);
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (granting states the same control over Senate elections that Article 1,
Section 2 gives them over House elections); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (the right to vote shall not
be denied based on sex); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (the right to vote shall not be denied based on
ability to a pay poll tax); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (the right to vote shall not be denied based on
age).
191. See Douglas, supra note 189, at 96–97 (citing Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178
(1874) (“[T]he Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one
. . . .”).
192. Id. at 97.
193. Id.
194. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
195. Id. at 370.
196. See Douglas, supra note 189, at 97.
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to vote is protected beyond the prohibitions listed in other
amendments. Of course, the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects the right to vote was not novel: Justice Black had argued that
voting rights were protected from improper redistricting by the
Fourteenth Amendment in his dissenting opinion from Colegrove in
1946.197 But it was not until Baker that the Court held that the right to
vote, secured by the Equal Protection Clause, may be violated by
gerrymandering.198 In deciding that the claim was justiciable, the
Court looked to the Fourteenth Amendment to locate a judicial
standard for gerrymandering claims.199 The Court held that the
“[j]udicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well
developed and familiar” and that the courts are well adept at
determining when “discrimination reflects no policy, but simply
arbitrary and capricious action.”200
However, the courts would come to realize that applying these
“well developed and familiar standards” to redistricting claims would
be more difficult than the Baker Court believed. The issue for the
courts was identifying just what was “arbitrary and capricious”
because reasonable judges could disagree about whether maps
reflected intentional discrimination or naturally accruing
imbalances.201 In response to these concerns, the Court adopted the
one person, one vote doctrine, a clear bright-line rule for
reapportionment cases.202 In contrast, the Court in Gill was still trying
to define a clear standard for gerrymandering cases.
B. Gerrymandering and the Impossible Fourteenth Amendment
Standard
Once the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment offered
protections for voting rights, the courts began to grapple with the
question: how much politics is too much politics in the redistricting

197. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 569 (1956) (Black, J., dissenting).
198. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962) (“A citizen’s right to a vote free of arbitrary
impairment by state action has been judicially recognized as a right secured by the Constitution . .
. .”).
199. Id. at 226.
200. Id.
201. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 193 (2012).
202. Id. at 193–94; see, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (“The Equal
Protection Clause demands no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all
citizens, of all places as well as of all races.”).
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process.203 A question that has proven significantly more difficult to
answer than how equal do populations within districts have to be. As
a result, the federal jurisprudence on gerrymandering has limited the
applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment protections to
gerrymandering cases.
Building on the holding in Baker, the Bandemer Court would find
that political redistricting claims were justiciable, in part because the
Fourteenth Amendment provided a discoverable and manageable
standard.204 And, just as the Justices in Baker suggested, the Court
used a familiar Equal Protection standard: intent plus effect.205
However, deciding on this test got courts no closer to deciding
how much politics is acceptable. The standard was initially developed
for racial discrimination cases, where any showing of discriminatory
effect, based on discriminatory intent, is sufficient.206 In contrast, the
Court has held that some amount of redistricting for political gain is
inevitable and legal.207 For instance, redistricting to protect
incumbents has long been held to be a legitimate motive.208 As a result,
the Court held that “unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when
the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently
degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the political
process as a whole.”209
This standard created two serious problems for future litigants.
First, the holding is based on assumptions that are being challenged by
research done on the House elections since 2000.210 The Court reasons
that the power to influence elections as a whole cannot be determined
by the loss of one election.211 The losing party voters are presumed to
be adequately represented by the winning party’s representative and
can change the outcome of the next elections if they are not.212

203. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 297 (2004) (defining the original unanswered
question as “How much political motivation and effect is too much?”).
204. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 123–24 (1986).
205. Id. at 127.
206. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281, 285–86.
207. Id. at 285–86.
208. Id. at 298.
209. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132.
210. See discussion on the McGann study and the competitiveness of the 2002 elections, supra
Part IV.
211. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 131–32.
212. Id. at 132, 135.
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However, redistricting can affect a party’s ability to win an election
for a decade.213
The second issue is that despite the increase in research conducted
on elections and gerrymandering, the Bandemer test has proven to be
a potentially impossible standard. Writing for the plurality in Vieth,
Justice Scalia detailed the difficulty courts have had in applying the
Bandemer test, specifically noting that in the eighteen years since the
test was developed no court has invalidated a map based on
gerrymandering.214 As a result, the plurality held that “[b]ecause this
standard was misguided when proposed, has not been improved in
subsequent application, and is not even defended before us today by
the appellants, we decline to affirm it as a constitutional
requirement.”215
However, the plurality was not able to undo the precedent set by
Bandemer, and the plaintiffs in Gill are again attempting to persuade
the Court that this standard can be met. But, given the Court’s
requirement that plaintiffs show they have been “shut out of the
political process,”216 the question becomes, why are plaintiffs looking
to the Fourteenth Amendment to protect their rights against vote
dilutions? Legal scholars have suggested alternative suits could be
brought under the First Amendment217 or Due Process Clause.218
However, given the Court’s ambivalence about the justiciability of
gerrymandering claims, this Note instead argues that state courts offer
a better forum for such claims.
C. State Courts Can Interpret Their Own Constitutions to Protect
Voting Rights
State courts offer plaintiffs two advantages: 1) state constitutions
include more explicit protections for voters, and 2) state courts are not
limited by the limited and still unsettled federal precedent discussed
above.

213. See MCGANN ET AL., supra note 29, at 192.
214. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 279–280 (2004).
215. Id. at 283–84.
216. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 139.
217. See Justin Levitt, Symposium: Intent is Enough, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 9, 2017, 10:44
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-intent-enough/.
218. Edward B. Foley, Due Process, Fair Play, and Excessive Partisanship: A New Principle
for Judicial Review of Election Laws, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 655 (2017).
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Unlike federal courts, state courts do not need to search for a
provision in the United States Constitution to support a finding that
the right to vote extends to gerrymandering claims. The constitutions
of forty-nine states explicitly make voting a substantive right.219 These
provisions (“Voting Provision”) usually include language that a
citizen “‘shall be qualified to vote,’ ‘shall be entitled to vote,’ or ‘is a
qualified elector.’”220 Arizona is the only state that uses negative
language, similar to that found in the United States Constitution, in its
Voting Provision.221 In addition, twenty-six states provide further
protection because their constitutions include provisions requiring
elections to be “‘free,’ ‘free and open,’ or ‘free and equal.’”222 Thus,
unlike federal courts, state courts do not have to limit their analysis of
gerrymandering claims by trying to determine which provision of the
United States Constitution they derive the right to vote from.
Moreover, state courts should find that state legislatures are
bound by these Voting Provisions. In Smiley v. Holm,223 the Court
explained the limits that could be placed on the power given to state
legislatures under Article 1, Section 4 of the United States
Constitution (“Election Clause”).224 The Minnesota Constitution
required any bill passed by the state legislature to be approved by the
governor or, after reconsideration by the legislature, passed by a twothirds vote.225 However, the defendant argued that the Election Clause
created a duty given to the state legislature which could not be limited
by the state constitution.226
The Court disagreed, holding that the Election Clause did not
confer a duty but rather authority to make laws for the state.227 Because
the state legislature is exercising its law making power when it
redistricts, it must use its authority in accordance with the state

219. Douglas, supra note 189, at 101.
220. Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting COLO. CONST. art. VII, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. II, § 1;
N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1). For more information about the specific language of each state’s Voting
Rights Clause see the table at the end of Douglas’s article.
221. Id. at 102.
222. Id. at 103.
223. 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
224. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations . . . .”).
225. Smiley, 285 U.S. at 363.
226. Id. at 372.
227. Id. at 367.
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constitution.228 Building on the holding in Smiley, the Court, in
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission,229 held that a citizen initiative to give redistricting
control to an independent commission did not violate the Election
Clause’s grant of authority to state legislatures.230 Thus, state
legislatures should be equally bound by the Voting Provisions.
Next, state courts should not bind themselves based on federal
precedent. In his article State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, Justice Brennan argues that state courts should not
defer to federal precedent, even when their decisions are based on state
constitutional provisions that are similarly or identically phrased to
those in the United States Constitution.231 Instead state courts should
see decisions based on federal law as merely persuasive and decide for
themselves if they are convinced by the Supreme Court’s opinions.232
Importantly, “state courts that rest their decisions wholly or even
partly on state law need not apply federal principles of standing and
justiciability that deny litigants access to the courts.”233 Thus, state
courts do not need to seek a judicially discoverable and manageable
standard, or use the Bandemer standard, even in cases involving state
equal protection clauses.
Moreover, the Bill of Rights was drafted to mirror the rights
granted under various state constitutions, rather than states reiterating
federally protected rights in their constitutions.234 In order to draft the
Bill of Rights, the Framers looked to state constitutions and included
only rights which were protected by one or more state constitutions.235
Additionally, until the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted and the
Bill of Rights was held applicable to state action, state constitutions
were independently interpreted as controls on state actions.236
Justice Brennan’s reasoning is even more applicable when
applied to cases based on state constitutional provisions that have no
analogous United States constitutional provision. As discussed above,

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at 367–68.
135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
Id. at 2659.
Brennan, supra note 1, at 500, 502.
Id. at 502.
Id. at 501.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 501–02.
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state constitutions include provisions expressly granting citizens the
right to vote, while the United States Constitution only provides
prohibitions on government actions.237 State courts interpreting the
Voting Provisions, therefore, have no controlling federal cases
interpreting a federal counter part. Moreover, it can be inferred by the
inclusion of Voting Provisions that states did not believe the United
States Constitution provided adequate protection for such an important
right. Therefore, if state courts were to base their decisions on federal
gerrymandering jurisprudence, they would “thwart[] a state court’s
ability to provide the heightened level of protection that state
constitutions’ direct provision of the right to vote demands.”238
Instead, state courts should use federal jurisprudence only as a
guideline for deciding what protection their respective constitutions
offer. Accordingly, state courts would be a much better forum to
litigate gerrymandering claims, regardless of the outcome of Gill.
State courts do not need to base gerrymandering claims on violations
of the Fourteenth Amendment or worry about federal justiciability.
Historically, state courts have protected individuals from improper
actions by state governments, and, given the extensive impact
gerrymandering has on voters’ rights, the courts should not shy away
from the opportunity to do so now.
VI. CONCLUSION
Over the last decade gerrymandering has attracted a higher level
of public consciousness, possibly due to a combination of social
media, the twenty-four-hour news cycle, and the willingness of
legislatures to gerrymander even more aggressively. The public’s
increasing dissatisfaction with the United States electoral system and
with the representatives it puts in power has created a perfect storm.
More voters are looking for a way to combat what they see as unfair
voting processes. But in the case of gerrymandering, it appears that
Congress and the federal courts are unable or unwilling to provide
much protection.
This Note has offered an overview of how gerrymandering works
to undermine the intent of the Framers to create representational
government. Modern election results may be less reflective of the

237. Douglas, supra note 189, at 101.
238. See id. at 124.
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voters’ choices and more reflective of legislative interference. In
addition, this Note has provided a basic summary of notoriously
complicated federal Equal Protection voting rights jurisprudence in
the hope of giving the reader an understanding of the difficulties faced
by federal litigants. Sometimes gerrymandering works in small, subtle
ways that nevertheless affect the voters’ ability to elect
representatives. In addition, incumbent protection makes
representatives less responsive to the will of voters and diminishes
voters’ power to respond.
This Note argues that state courts could be an alternative to the
uphill battle litigants face in federal courts. State courts offer voters a
chance to create new, stronger protections against gerrymandering that
are not limited by federal precedent. First, state courts can use the
states’ Voting Provisions, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, to
invalidate district maps. Second, state courts have the freedom to
create a higher level of protection, beyond only that form of
gerrymandering that deprives someone or a group of access to the
political process as whole. In fact, state courts have historically
interpreted their constitutions as creating broader rights than those
found in the United States Constitution. Precisely because these
Voting Provisions have no analogous United States constitutional
provision, there is no controlling federal authority to handcuff state
courts. Thus, state courts should take up the call by voters to protect
the integrity of elections, and to create new limits on gerrymandering.

